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THE PragmaTIc coNfUcIaN aPProacH To TraDITIoN  
IN moDErNIzINg cHINa
Sor-HooN TaN
abSTracT
This paper explores the confucian veneration of the past and its commitment to trans-
mitting the tradition of the sages. It does so by placing it in the context of the historical 
trajectory from the may fourth attacks on confucianism and its scientistic, iconoclastic 
approach to “saving china,” to similar approaches to china’s modernization in later 
decades, through the market reforms that launched china into global capitalism, to the 
revival of confucianism in recent years. It reexamines the association of the Pragmatism 
of John Dewey and Hu Shih with the scientistic iconoclasm of the may fourth movement 
and argues that a broader scrutiny of Dewey’s and Hu’s works, beyond the period when 
Dewey visited china, reveals a more balanced treatment of tradition, science, and modern-
ization. Pragmatists believe in reconstructing, not destroying, traditions in their pursuit of 
growth for individuals and communities. Despite a tension between the progress-oriented 
historical consciousness that Dewey inherited from the Enlightenment (a consciousness 
that some consider as characteristic of modern Western historiography) and the historical 
consciousness underlying chinese historiographical tradition (one that views the past as 
a didactic “mirror”), it is possible to reconcile the Pragmatic reconstruction of tradition 
with the confucian veneration of the past. This paper argues for a Pragmatic confucian 
approach to chinese traditions that is selective in its transmission of the past and flexible 
enough in its “preservation” to allow for progressive change.
Keywords: confucianism, Pragmatism, John Dewey, Hu Shih, tradition, iconoclasm, sci-
entism, change, progress
I. TraDITIoN aND coNfUcIaNISm
modern mandarin translates “tradition” as “传统 chuan-tong.” This captures the 
key semantic component of transmission with “chuan 传,” and adds the con-
notations of both unity/continuity and governing norm/guide with “tong 统.” 
Together they convey well the meaning of “that which is transmitted from the 
past, which unites and governs or provides guidance to a group or community.” 
The term matches the contemporary conception of tradition as having an inher-
ently normative element that demands respect and obligation to accept and pass 
on. as Edward Shils noted, “It is this normative transmission which links the 
generations of the dead with the generations of the living in the constitution of 
a society. . . . The normativeness of tradition is the inertial force which holds 
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society in a given form over time.”1 It is therefore not surprising that the idea of 
tradition has figured prominently in recent discourses on nationalism and on other 
issues involving questions of the identity of groups or communities. 
although “传统 chuan-tong” has only recently been adopted as the translation 
for “tradition” in twentieth-century intellectual and public discourses, it is already 
implicit in the chinese normative approach to history and the explicit confucian 
veneration of the past. confucius is often viewed as a traditionalist: someone who 
values something simply because it has been passed on for generations. Analects 
7.1 gives credence to this view: “following the proper way, I do not forge new 
paths; with confidence I cherish the ancients.”2 Whether one considers it accurate 
to portray confucius’s mission solely in terms of transmission of the valued way 
of the ancients, there is no doubt that confucius and his students valued what 
had been transmitted to them and were committed to passing on that legacy. In 
Analects 1.4, a student of confucius, master zeng, examined himself daily by 
asking, “In what has been passed on to me, have I failed to carry it into practice?” 
Education, the process of learning and teaching so central to the Ru 儒 commu-
nity, is a process of transmission across generations.3 confucius’s own love of 
learning is at the same time love for the past, as he repeatedly held up the “way 
of the ancients” as a model for his students (Analects 3.16; 4.22; 14.24; 14.40; 
17.16). He confessed to not having been born with knowledge and described 
himself as one who, “loving antiquity, was earnest in seeking it” (Analects 7.20). 
Thus confucius was committed to learning from the legacy of the past and pass-
ing it on, first by embodying what he learned in practice (Analects 1.1) and then 
by propagating it through example and instruction.
The master said, “To quietly persevere in storing up what is learned, to continue studying 
without respite, to instruct others without growing weary—is this not me?” (Analects 7.2)
The master said, “To fail to cultivate excellence (de 德), to fail to practice what I learn, 
on coming to understand what is appropriate (yi义) in the circumstances to fail to attend to 
it, and to be unable to reform conduct that is not productive—these things I worry over.” 
(Analects 7.3) 
although “tong 统” does not appear in the Analects, the idea that continuity 
and unity in what is transmitted provide a distinctive identity to a culture or com-
munity was nevertheless present.4 confucius especially valued the cultural legacy 
of the zhou dynasty (Analects 3.14), but it is not a legacy created out of noth-
ing. confucius saw the zhou culture as continuous with the earlier dynasties in 
what it learned from the latter, and similarly he expected any successor, even ten 
generations hence, to be identifiable by similar continuity (Analects 2.23). This 
1. Edward Shils, Tradition (London and boston: faber, 1981), 24, 25.
2. The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation, transl. roger T. ames and Henry 
rosemont, Jr. (New York: ballantine, 1998). In-text citations give volume and page numbers of the 
translation.
3.  confucius and his followers identify themselves and are identified as “ru 儒,” the chinese term 
for his school of thought; this term had been used to refer to ritual experts or scholars even before 
confucius’s time.
4. In the Mencius, there is one occurrence of “tong” that D. c. Lau translates as “tradition”: “all 
a gentleman can do in starting an enterprise is to leave behind a tradition which can be carried on.” 
Mencius 1b14 in Mencius, transl. D. c. Lau (Hong Kong: chinese University Press, 1984). 
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cultural legacy is the common inheritance that distinguished the people of the 
central plains from others and rendered them superior in confucius’s eyes: “The 
Yi and Di barbarian tribes with rulers are not as viable as the various chinese 
states without them” (Analects 3.5). The implied superiority of the chinese lies 
in the ritual propriety (li 礼) that is the core of the tradition valued by confucius. 
according to Xunzi, the great Ru are those who “hold to the guiding lines of 
ritual and moral principles (tong-li-yi 统礼义)” (Xunzi 2:80), and society is held 
together by “the way of the ancient kings and the guiding principles of human-
ity and justice (ren-yi-zhi-tong 仁义之统)” (Xunzi 1:192-93).5 The Xunzi also 
emphasizes ritual propriety together with the laws and standards instituted and 
transmitted by ancient sage kings as the “points of common agreement” among 
people (3:235), and views political order as constituted by appropriately employ-
ing a range of talents in government, including those capable of transmitting 
values, standards, institutions, and appropriate practices (2:191). Later confu-
cians were even more self-conscious about the process of transmission; this is 
most evident in the debates about “道统 dao-tong,” which a. S. cua explicitly 
compared with Shil’s theory of tradition.6
II. moDErNIzaTIoN aND WESTErN-cENTrIc ScIENTISTIc IcoNocLaSm
It is not an exaggeration to portray confucians as self-appointed custodians of 
chinese culture and tradition. based on fei Xiaotong’s study of chinese society 
in the early decades of the twentieth century, the rule of ritual advocated by 
confucians is in practice a rule of tradition, since “ritual norms are maintained 
by tradition.”7 given its identification with traditional chinese society, confu-
cianism would also bear the brunt of the attacks in china’s turbulent pursuit of 
modernization, a process defined in opposition to tradition. a whole generation 
of may fourth intellectuals rejected traditional chinese thought and practices, 
in particular confucianism, as the millstone around china’s neck, the cause of 
its decline and its falling victim to imperialistic powers that had successfully 
modernized. This is very much in tune with the Enlightenment ethos exalting 
the idea of progress in terms of reforming or discarding inherited institutions, a 
progress driven by scientific knowledge based on empirical evidence and critical 
reason, totally hostile to tradition, which upholds the “authority of elders.”8 It is 
no wonder that leading figures of the may fourth movement such as chen Duxiu 
considered “demolishing the confucian shop” a necessary step toward reaching 
5. Unless otherwise stated, quotes from Xunzi are from Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the 
Complete Works, transl. John Knoblock (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988, 1990, 1994). In-
text citations give volume and page numbers of the translation. on the junzi’s role in transmitting the 
“guidelines of ritual and appropriateness (liyi zhi tong), see 1:179.
6. a.S. cua, “confucianism: Tradition—Daotong (Tao-t’ung),” in Encyclopedia of Chinese Phi-
losophy, ed. a. S. cua (New York and London: routledge, 2003), 153-160; a. S. cua, “The Idea of 
confucian Tradition,” Review of Metaphysics 45, no. 4 (June 1992), 803-840.
7. fei Xiaotong, From the Soil: The Foundations of Chinese Society, transl. gary g. Hamilton and 
Wang zheng (berkeley: University of california Press, 1992), 97.
8. Shils, Tradition, 4. It is with good reason that the may fourth movement is also known as the 
“chinese Enlightenment.” Vera Schwarcz, The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy 
of the May Fourth Movement of 1919 (berkeley: University of california Press, 1986).
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the goals of “science” and “democracy.”9 Such iconoclasm also characterized the 
cultural revolution’s determination to “break the four olds”—old thinking, old 
culture, old customs, and old habits—and is very much present in the iconic work 
of the late 1980s’ “cultural fever,” the River Elegy.10 
The attack on chinese traditions during the may fourth period went hand in 
hand with turning to the West for the “new” and “modern.” Translations of many 
Western works, from the classics to contemporary writings, were published 
as monographs and in periodicals, such as the New Youth, the standard bearer 
of the New culture movement.11 Experts from america and Europe in various 
fields, including philosophers such as bertrand russell and John Dewey, were 
invited to china for lecture tours. Dewey stayed in china for more than two years 
(1919–1921) and lectured to enthusiastic audiences in the thousands.12 He had 
taught several chinese students at columbia University, several of whom were 
prominent in the New culture movement and who saw Dewey’s visit as a great 
opportunity for china to learn about “science” and “democracy.” 
Supporting “complete Westernization,” Hu Shih accused chinese traditional 
thought of “self-inflicted refusal to think or reason.”13 In urging readers to choose 
Western civilization, Hu Shih equated it with “modern civilization,” which he 
described in glowing terms: “Using the weapons of science, modern civiliza-
9. chen Duxiu, “The Way of confucius and modern Life,” translated in Sources of Chinese Tra-
dition, comp. William Theodore de bary, Wing-tsit chan, and chester Tan (New York: columbia 
University Press, 1960), II, 153-156. See also Wu Yu, Collected Essays (Shanghai: oriental Press, 
1921); Hu Shih’s preface to this collection of essays is the source of the may fourth slogan “Down 
with the confucian shop.”
10. See chen Lai’s illuminating account of “radicalism in 20th century cultural movements,” in 
his Tradition and Modernity: Horizons of Humanism (beijing: Peking University Press, 2006), chap-
ter 4. for the connection between the may fourth movement and the “cultural fever” of the 1980s, 
see Xu Jilin, Another Kind of Enlightenment (guangzhou: Huachang, 1999); From May Fourth to 
“River Elegy,” ed. Su Xiaokang (Taipei: fengyun shidai, 1992).
11. The New Youth was started in 1915 by chen Duxiu initially with the title Youth Magazine; the 
new name, adopted in September 1916, besides being more catchy, more importantly reflected the 
obsession with the “new” at the time. many other periodicals of that period carried “new” in their 
titles. The New culture movement is sometimes equated with the may fourth movement; those who 
see them as separate would nevertheless acknowledge considerable overlap between them.
12. Dewey’s visit and his influence on china has been examined in barry Keenan, The Dewey 
Experiment: Educational Reform and Political Power in the Early Republic (cambridge, ma: Har-
vard University Press, 1977), and more recently in Jessica ching-Sze Wang, John Dewey in China: 
To Teach and to Learn (albany: State University of New York Press, 2007). chinese scholars have 
written many articles about Dewey’s visit and influence in china; recent books on the topic include 
gu Hongliang, Misreading of Pragmatism: The Influence of Dewey’s Philosophy on China’s Mod-
ern Philosophy (Shanghai: East china Normal University Press, 2000); Yang Shoukan and Wang 
chengbing, Pragmatism in China (Shanghai: East china Normal University Press, 2002); Our Views 
of Pragmatism: Dewey in China, ed. zhang baohui (Nanchang: Jiangxi gaoxiao, 2009). Dewey’s 
lectures, which went through several printings during his visit, have also been reissued: Dewey’s 
Five Major Lectures, transl. Hu Shih (Hefei: anhui Education Press, 1999); Democracy and Modern 
Society: Dewey’s Collected Lectures in China, ed. Yuan gang, Sun Jiaxiang, and ren bingqiang 
(beijing: Peking University Press, 2004). See also the study of Dewey’s visit in the context of Prag-
matism’s relevance to china’s democratization in Sor-hoon Tan, “china’s Pragmatist Experiment in 
Democracy: Hu Shih’s Pragmatism and Dewey’s Influence in china,” Metaphilosophy 35, no. 1/2 
(2004), 44-64. 
13. Hu Shih, “our attitude toward modern Western civilization,” in Hu Shih’s Complete Works 
(Hefei: anhui Education Press, 2003), XXXVI, 91; a shortened version was published in a Japanese 
journal, Contemporary Review 83 (July 10, 1926).
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tion has opened a new world and has discovered countless new truths, gaining a 
mastery over innumerable natural forces; compelling electricity to haul cars and 
the other to carry messages. Truly it has performed many marvels able to shake 
the earth and open heavens.”14 The contrast between motorcars and rickshaws 
pulled by humans epitomized for Hu the difference between West and East. He 
dismissed the common contrast of the materialistic West versus the spiritual East 
as a benighted apology for backwardness. for him, the “fundamental difference” 
between East and West lay elsewhere: 
The difference between Eastern and Western civilizations is simply a degree of success 
or failure in the process of breaking away from the medieval ideas and institutions which 
once ruled the whole civilized world. The modern civilization of the West, as I have tried 
to show in the preceding paragraphs, represents a higher degree of success in the emanci-
pation from medievalism than any other cultural group has yet achieved.15 
Hu had much in common with later modernization theorists who viewed the 
advance of all societies as subject to a similar pattern of development and the 
experience of “modern” societies as the model for those yet to modernize. There 
was no doubt in his mind that chinese traditions were perpetuated by “slavish 
acceptance of authority” and were preventing the chinese from modernizing 
through science and technology. 
Hu Shih sided with those who rejected traditional thought and practice in 
the name of modern science in public debates about chinese traditions during 
the 1920s and 30s, such as the debate about science and the philosophy of life. 
carsun zhang delivered a lecture in 1923 at Qinghua University claiming that 
science cannot provide a “philosophy of life” necessary for living meaningful 
and ethical human lives; rather, a philosophy of life, as could be found in chi-
nese culture and traditional thought, is required to judge the appropriateness of 
adopting science. Those who defended the value of science in “reconstructing” 
or “saving” china quickly joined the battle. Hu’s preface to a collection of the 
writings contributing to this debate defended a “naturalistic philosophy of sci-
ence” based on the “materialistic and mechanical” worldview of science rejected 
by zhang and other cultural conservatives.16 Science, and the scientific method 
in particular, enables us to act on the basis of knowledge tested in use, and where 
such knowledge is absent, to seek it on the basis of some other existing knowl-
edge. for Hu Shih, the only alternative to this is a superstitious supernaturalism 
that only causes harm. His boundless confidence in the ability of science to bring 
progress for human societies left him open to the charge of scientism, “the view 
which places all reality within a natural order and deems all aspects of this order, 
be they biological, social, physical, or psychological, to be knowable only by the 
14. Ibid., 92.
15. Hu, “The civilizations of the East and West,” in Complete Works, XXXVI, 333. 
16. zhang Junmai, Ding Wenjiang et al., Science and the Philosophy of Life [1925] (Jinan: Shan-
dong People’s Press, 1997). See also Hu’s criticism of the “Declaration on chinese-based cultural 
construction” published by ten university professors in 1935, in Complete Works, IV, 578-583. 
The declaration was first published in Cultural Construction Monthly and was intended to be the 
foundation of a cultural movement to rival the New culture movement. for the declaration and the 
publications that appeared in the public debate that followed, see Discussions on Chinese Cultural 
Construction, ed. ma fangruo (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian, 1989).
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methods of science,” especially when he admitted that he was “thinking about 
taking down his shingle as a philosopher and leaving all philosophizing to the 
scientists.”17 He went far beyond recognizing the close relation between philoso-
phy and science to eliminate the differences between them. 
Philosophy and science, as we all know, are the two names for one and the same thing. The 
history of thought clearly tells us that philosophy which began in the ancient world as bad 
science or primitive science, has, at least in the West, happily come out as real science, as 
good and true science. Philosophy as bad science is dead or dying; but philosophy as good 
or true science is very much alive.18
Scientism and anti-tradition radicalism are two sides of the same coin in chi-
nese conceptions of modernization from may fourth, through the communist 
revolution, the adoption of marxism in the building of the People’s republic of 
china, the great Proletarian cultural revolution, the reform period under Deng 
Xiaoping, up to the present post-Deng era of the headlong rush to join the global 
economic race. chen Lai observed that in the post-cold War era, the understand-
ing of “modernity” has once again been dominated by the “hegemony of instru-
mental rationality,” and after the “central planning” alternative economic model 
became defunct, the “market economy once again has been recognized as the 
only path of modernization.”19 This homogenization continues in the face of pro-
liferating discourses challenging the hegemonic conception of modernization that 
has come to be identified with “Westernization.” amid discussions of “multiple 
modernities” and arguments about an East asian alternative model of develop-
ment and asian values, more people are coming around to chen Lai’s view that 
“East asia should go further in drawing nutrients from the spiritual resources of 
its traditions to help solve current issues and build a more harmonious modern 
world in East asia.”20 chen resists the reduction of the value of confucian ethics 
to its effect on economic development, maintaining that beyond material comfort 
and economic prosperity, modern human beings still “need ultimate concerns, 
ethical ideals, meaning in life, social interactions,” and in these respects of a 
broader understanding of modernization, confucianism still has an important role 
to play at least in East asia and perhaps even globally.21 
could Dewey’s Pragmatism have a role to play in the next phase of china’s 
struggle with the issues of tradition and modernization? Despite some revival 
of interest in academic circles, Deweyan Pragmatism is not a dominant force in 
contemporary intellectual discourses in china. The “new pragmatism,” with its 
emphasis on “daily life and individual satisfaction,” legitimizing of consumer 
17. Hu Shih, “aims and Hopes of mankind in Light of advancing Science and Technology,” in 
Complete Works, XXXV, 258. This definition of “scientism” is given by Daniel Kwok, Scientism in 
Chinese Thought 1900–1950 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), 21. besides Kwok’s detailed 
account of the role of scientism in twentieth-century china, a more recent work on the topic is Wang 
zuoyue, “Saving china through Science: The Science Society of china, Scientific Nationalism, and 
civil Society in republican china,” Osiris 17 (2002), 291-322.
18. Hu, “aims and Hopes,” 258.
19. chen, Tradition and Modernity, 182. on the scientistic element in chinese cultural radical-
ism from may fourth to the present, see ibid., chapter 4. See also Liu Qingfeng, “Two risings of 
Scientism in Twentieth century china,” Twenty-First Century 4 (1991), 32-47.
20. chen, Tradition and Modernity, 182.
21. Ibid., 206.
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culture and “a necessary indifference” to ideals, is very different from Dewey’s 
philosophy.22 Nor should Dewey’s philosophical Pragmatism be confused with 
the vulgar “pragmatism” that is no more than a kind of unprincipled opportun-
ism.23 Judging solely by the first unsatisfactory historical encounter between 
Pragmatism and china, one may be tempted to dismiss Pragmatism as having 
nothing to contribute that had not been offered by the scientistic iconoclasts 
of the past, when what we need is a more innovative approach to tradition that 
leaves behind the old dualism of tradition versus modernity, with science, critical 
reason, and freedom viewed as the exclusive domain of the latter. 24 I shall show, 
however, that the accusations against Hu Shih and Dewey of scientism associated 
with iconoclasm oversimplify their views and lead us to overlook the important 
potential of Pragmatism that could be helpful in dealing with the tension between 
tradition and modernization in china today.
III. HU SHIH: “PUTTINg IN orDEr THE NaTIoNaL HErITagE”
Hu Shih undoubtedly believed that, for china in the 1920s, clinging to reified 
traditions would have resulted in far greater damage than that resulting from sci-
entism, and in his frustration with the slowness of needed social change, his writ-
ings often come across as insensitive to the dangers of worshipping the achieve-
ments of the physical sciences. To be fair, these dangers are probably clearer 
today with hindsight than was evident then. Hu’s sometimes extreme polemics 
must be understood against the rising tide of reactionary views about chinese 
tradition throughout the 1920s and 1930s and the association of some forms of 
cultural conservatism with the authoritarian party in power from 1928. The latter 
rendered cultural conservatism particularly pernicious from the chinese liberals’ 
perspective. In Hu’s view, the Guomindang was trotting out confucius as deus 
ex machina, and misappropriating tradition to hide its inability to solve real prob-
lems and improve the people’s lives.25 His insistence on a critical attitude toward 
tradition was in part resistance against the ruling party’s attempt to impose yet 
another state orthodoxy on the people. His radicalism is often more apparent than 
real when one takes a closer look at his entire career. While others referred to the 
may fourth movement as the “chinese Enlightenment,” Hu Shih described it as a 
“chinese renaissance,” “led by men who knew their cultural heritage and tried to 
study it with the new methodology of modern historical criticism and research.”26 
22. zhang fa, zhang Yiwu, and Wang Yichuan, “from ‘modernity’ to ‘chineseness,’” Contend-
ing Voices in the Arts 2 (1994), 17.
23. for more detailed discussion of what passes for “pragmatism” in chinese contemporary dis-
course, see Sor-hoon Tan, “our country right or Wrong: a Pragmatic response to anti-democratic 
cultural Nationalism in china,” Contemporary Pragmatism 7, no. 2 (December 2010), 52-54.
24. Lin Yu-sheng, The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness: Radical Anti-Traditionalism in the May 
Fourth Era (madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979), chapter 5; cf. a more sympathetic view 
of Hu’s promotion of science in Jerome grieder, Hu Shih and the Chinese Renaissance (cambridge, 
ma: Harvard University Press, 1970), 151-158.
25. Hu Shih, “Written after celebrations of confucius’ birthday,” in Complete Works, IV, 527-
534. Nearly all the signatories to the 1935 “Declaration on chinese-based cultural construction” 
were Guomindang members or were closely associated with the party.
26. Hu Shih, Chinese Renaissance (Haskell Lectures), in Complete Works, XXXVII, 76. 
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Hu first used this term in 1923 in an article with that title, in which he traced the 
movement’s roots to two movements for political reform in the seventeenth cen-
tury—the Donglin and Fushe movements—and the Han Learning (or kaozheng, 
evidential research) of the Qing dynasty.27 from this account, the may fourth 
movement is not iconoclastic but arguably is itself part of a tradition. 
Despite the expressed desire cited earlier to abandon philosophy for science, 
Hu saw philosophy and science as complementary in his reflection on scientific 
method in the research of Qing dynasty scholars. “Philosophers without the expe-
rience of science cannot speak fully about scientific method. Scientists without 
philosophical interest also cannot speak fully about scientific method.”28 Even 
though he urged his fellow chinese to imitate the West wholeheartedly, and 
harshly criticized chinese tradition for being backward and inhumane, Hu found 
creative though not always convincing connections between china’s past and 
the modern West. He called mencius “the montesquieu of the orient” and dis-
covered foundations for democracy in ancient china. He argued that confucius 
believed in the “right to doubt.” He heard in fan zhongyan’s “better to die crying 
out than to live in silence” a cry for freedom of expression.29 He believed that 
these elements in chinese tradition helped the chinese feel comfortable with the 
new Western knowledge and at home in the modern world.30 He was well aware 
that knowledge of their own cultural heritage was important for the chinese if 
the desired outcome of cultural transformation was to be a chinese civilization 
rather than its total displacement. Just as he did not see science as always opposed 
to tradition, Hu did not always reject tradition in favor of science, but instead 
acknowledged the value of some traditional thought and practices as long as 
they complemented rather than obstructed science. Hu discussed the “aims and 
hopes of humanity in light of advancing science” in terms of “an ancient chinese 
dictum, a real antiquarian piece dated 620 bce,” veering dangerously close to the 
position of cultural conservatives who believed that chinese traditional philoso-
phy of life should judge how (and whether) to adopt science.31 
Hu recognized the value of the chinese classics and of some traditional 
practices. rather than completely discarding traditional mourning rituals as 
unscientific superstition, he experimented with simplifying the details and mak-
ing modifications that left out what he considered superstitious, inhumane, or 
27. Hu Shih, “chinese renaissance,” in Complete Works, XXXV, 632-681. In the Haskell Lec-
tures, Hu identified five such renaissances in chinese history, the first occurring during the Tang 
dynasty, with the New culture movement being the fifth.
28. Hu Shih, “Qing Dynasty Scholars’ research methods,” in Complete Works, I, 364.
29. Hu Shih, “a republic for china,” in Complete Works, XXXV, 3-6; “The Important role of 
Doubt in chinese Thought,” in Complete Works, XXXIX, 315-344; see also “The right to Doubt in 
ancient chinese Thought,” Philosophy East and West 12, no. 4 (January 1963), 295-300; “‘better to 
Die crying out than to Live in Silence’—famous Words of fan zhongyan in His fight for freedom 
Nine Hundred Years ago,” in Complete Works, XXII, 778.
30. zhou changlong has argued in much greater detail how Hu Shih went beyond Westernization 
in grounding most of his life’s work, and his revolutionary attempts to recreate chinese civilization 
were actually continuous with chinese tradition. zhou changlong, Transcending the Western Tide: 
Hu Shi and Chinese Tradition (Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 2001). See also Wang Jianping and Yang 
guorong, Hu Shi and Chinese and Western Cultures (chengdu: Sichuan People’s Press, 1990), 
especially 263-285.
31. Hu, “aims and Hopes,” 259.
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harmful, but acknowledged the value of such rituals in expressing genuine and 
appropriate human emotions that justified continuing with ritual practices.32 
although he promoted the use of the vernacular language and argued that china 
needs a literature in this “national language” appropriate to the modern age, he 
nevertheless supported teaching the classical language in the secondary schools 
so that everyone would be able to read the chinese classics.33 His History of Bai-
hua Literature of the Last Three Hundred Years and his studies of the ming and 
Qing dynasties’ novels, notably the Dreams of the Red Chamber, hitherto con-
sidered unfit for serious scholarship and study, introduced a paradigmatic change 
in the understanding of chinese literary tradition. His equally groundbreaking 
History of Chinese Philosophy and other efforts in historiography were also both 
rooted in tradition, and were innovative in their use of new methods learned from 
the West.34 Later in life, Hu’s interest in traditional textual criticism became so 
engrossing that he admitted to being obsessed with it. 
Hu Shih saw his work on traditional chinese texts as a project of “putting in 
order the national heritage,” which he proposed as early as 1919 as part of the 
“new thinking” to accompany “reconstructing civilization” in china.35 West-
ernizers attacked Hu’s own studies of traditional texts and chinese history as 
attempts to “pick up treasures from the rubbish bin.”36 and yet, cultural conserva-
tives refused to accept his scholarship on the chinese classics, insisting that he 
was incapable of understanding confucianism (and traditional chinese literature) 
because of his erroneous methods and lack of hermeneutical sensitivity.37 To this 
group, anything positive Hu had to say about chinese tradition paled in compari-
son with his polemical attacks, which were often iconoclastic in tone and had 
greater impact on the wider public. In response, Hu Shih insisted that the cultural 
resources of china’s past had not been translated into the actual way of life of the 
majority of the chinese people, nor had they provided them with general edifica-
tion in the twentieth century because of the rigid conservatism of the custodians 
of china’s classical tradition. Too many chinese read ancient texts “by hearsay,” 
repeating what others had said, instead of employing scientific methods to ques-
tion and to sift through the evidence in order to clarify the meaning of ancient 
teachings and verify claims on the basis of contemporary experience. Hu wished 
to introduce systematic inquiry to understand tradition, in order to find the real 
meanings among apparently nonsensical and ridiculous claims, to extract real 
values and truths from what had degenerated into dogmas and superstitions.38 
While one may at times find the “scientific methods” Hu Shih employed in his 
treatment of chinese tradition too simplistic or crude, and quite possibly distort-
32. Hu Shih, “my reform of mourning rituals,” in Complete Works, I, 674-687.
33. Hu Shih, “Teaching of National Language in Secondary Schools,” in Complete Works, I, 
210-223.
34. See also Yan fei, “Hu Shih and Putting in order the National Heritage,” in Hu Shih and 
Modern China’s Cultural Transformation, ed. Liu Qingfeng (Hong Kong: chinese University Press, 
1994), 421-442.
35. Hu Shih, “The meaning of New Trends of Thought,” in Complete Works, I, 691-700.
36. See chen Xiying’s published comments accompanying Hu Shih’s “Putting in order the 
National Heritage and fighting ghosts,” in Complete Works, III, 151.
37. Liu, Modern China’s Cultural Transformation, 16-21.
38. Hu, “New Trends of Thought,” 698-699.
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ing, and therefore less than efficacious in retrieving the best from the past, his 
attention to “national heritage” and his participation in traditional scholarship 
should at least absolve him of the charge of malicious iconoclasm.
IV. DEWEY’S PragmaTIc aTTITUDES ToWarD TraDITIoN
Is Hu Shih’s continued positive interest in tradition compatible with the Deweyan 
Pragmatism he claimed had a lasting influence on his thinking? It has been sug-
gested that Hu Shih is more confucian than Pragmatist.39 could the pro-tradition 
side of his scholarship be attributed to confucian influence, with Pragmatism 
responsible for the elements of scientistic iconoclasm in his works? In an essay 
that Hu Shih himself had cited, “The Need for recovery in Philosophy,” Dewey 
had declared that, “Pragmatism is content to take its stand with science” (mW 
10:39).40 Dewey’s lectures in china have been dismissed as showing “Dewey at 
his scientistic worst.”41 However, the influence might not be entirely in one direc-
tion, as Dewey had to rely on interpreters and probably would have been influ-
enced by his closest chinese associates in understanding china. His remark in a 
lecture at the National Peking academy of fine arts identifying two great dan-
gers confronting “the orient” could have come from Hu Shih himself: one danger 
comes from “the people who feel threatened by a materialistic civilization, and 
want to resist it. They want to preserve the thought and habits of a conservative 
society, and hope that it will not be affected by materialism.”42 
In Dewey’s defense, it must be pointed out that his remark about Pragmatism 
taking its stand with science was in the specific context of the alleged need for a 
theory of reality, and even then Dewey went on to say that “Pragmatism in study-
ing things that happen”—all that “reality” means for Pragmatists—“also takes 
its stand with daily life, which finds that such things really have to be reckoned 
with as they occur interwoven in the texture of events” (mW 10:39). He was not 
advocating that everyone abandon philosophy for science. While admitting that 
“preoccupation with material progress” is among the defects of Western civiliza-
tion, Dewey emphasized that the West had more to offer than mere technology 
and commerce. To him, “the development of the scientific spirit and the cultiva-
tion of a new attitude toward life are far more important.”43 although Dewey 
often promoted the use of methods of natural sciences in solving social problems, 
and even identified “replacing the authority of tradition with the authority of 
science” as “the most pressing social problem in the modern world,” his china 
39. chen-te Yang, Hu Shih, Pragmatism, and the Chinese Tradition, PhD thesis (madison: Uni-
versity of Wisconsin, 1993). 
40. John Dewey: The Middle Works, 1899–1924, ed. Jo ann boydston, 15 vols. (carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1980–1983) (mW). In-text citations give volume and page 
numbers from this critical edition. also cited in text are The Early Works, 1882–1888, 5 vols. 
(carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969–1972) (EW); John Dewey: The Later Works, 
1925–1953, 17 vols. (carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981–1991) (LW).
41. robert c. Neville, Ritual and Deference (albany: State University of New York Press, 2008), 
167, note 16.
42. John Dewey, Lectures in China on Logic, Ethics, Education and Democracy, transl. robert 
clopton and Tsuin-chen ou (Taiwan: chinese culture University Press, 1985), 191.
43. Ibid., 190; John Dewey, Lectures in China, 1919–1920, transl. robert W. clopton and Tsuin-
chen ou (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1973), 235.
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lectures also pointed out differences between natural and social sciences and 
acknowledged that philosophy still has a role, however advanced science may 
become, precisely because philosophy is speculative in ways that science is not.44 
Dewey’s philosophical stance is more balanced than selective quotes may lead 
us to believe. If in retrospect he seemed to have overemphasized the importance 
of science, it was likely at the behest of chinese associates who believed that to 
be what his chinese audience needed most at that historical moment. Dewey’s 
Pragmatism is not inherently scientistic.45
The same chinese associates who emphasized china’s need for science would 
also have mentioned the pernicious hold of tradition on chinese society. This 
impression came through in Dewey’s lectures: “many chinese institutions, under 
the aegis of confucianism, have remained unaltered and unchallenged for more 
than two thousand years. When theory results in rigidity rather than in stability, 
it interferes with progress, and can thus prove dangerous.”46 Dewey’s writings 
for american audiences also mention the conservatism of the chinese and their 
attachment to tradition as obstructing progress (mW 12:25; mW 13:224), but 
his assessment tends to be relatively more nuanced. for example, he acknowl-
edged that for all their conservatism, “nevertheless their history is not a history 
of stagnation, of fixity, as we are falsely taught, but of social as well as dynastic 
changes. They have tried many experiments in their day” (mW 12:52). Still, 
his account of the events in china mostly echoed the views of New culture 
intellectuals such as Hu Shih, as when he observed in the chinese disregard for 
foreigners’ opinion a complacency and conceit that “has enormously retarded 
the advance of china and made for a conservative hugging of old traditions, and 
a belief in the inherent superiority of chinese civilization in all respects to that 
of foreign barbarians” (mW 11:209); and he described the fight over the use of 
vernacular language instead of the literary language of the chinese classics as 
merging “into one between conservatives and liberals in general, between the 
representatives of the old traditions and the representatives of western ideas and 
democratic institutions” (mW 12:25). 
In china, Dewey’s discussion of the bad effect of “developing a predisposi-
tion to obey the ancients”—treating knowledge as an already constituted product 
that could be transmitted through memorization, recitation, and examination, and 
“breeding an aristocracy of learning”—would have struck a familiar chord among 
those sympathetic to the New culture movement.47 Dewey himself was very 
sympathetic to the movement, and agreed to a large extent with its perspective 
on china’s problem. Dewey wrote in 1921 that the real problem of china was 
“that of adapting old china to new world conditions” (mW 13:98). “a new mind 
must be created” (mW 13:95). Dewey believed that the New culture movement, 
44. Dewey, Lectures (1973), 55, 57, 83, 167, 169. In his lectures on the philosophy of education 
(230-260), Dewey also spoke about the impact of the development of modern science on education, 
politics, people’s way of thinking, moral life, and the pursuit of knowledge.
45. for response to criticism of Dewey’s “scientism,” see Larry Hickman, “Pragmatism, Tech-
nology, and Scientism: are the methods of the Scientific Technical Disciplines relevant to Social 
Problems?” in Pragmatism: From Progressivism to Postmodernism, ed. robert Hollinger and David 
Depew (Westport, cT: Praeger, 1995), 72-87.
46. Dewey, Lectures (1973), 50. 
47. Dewey, Lectures (1985), 176.
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as an intellectual movement, would help to unify china’s mind, just as better 
means of communication would unify and strengthen the country. “It also makes 
a great deal of difference whether the mind when unified looks to the past or is 
in sympathy with modern thought in the rest of the world” (mW 13:119). While 
he recognized that modernization means more than mere materialistic advance, 
his conclusion seems antitradition, and anti-confucianism in particular: “What 
china needed was not merely improvement in material life. The notion that, by 
the mere introduction of western economy, china can be ‘saved,’ while it retains 
the morality, the old set of ideas, the old confucianism—or what genuine confu-
cianism had been petrified into—and the old family system, is the most utopian 
of sentimental idealism” (mW 13:103). but is it really? He certainly was insisting 
on the need for change, but he at least reserved judgment on whether what needed 
changing was “genuine confucianism” or merely “petrified” institutions. Nor is it 
clear that tradition is always “petrified” and undesirable in Dewey’s eyes. We get 
a more complete picture of his Pragmatic approach to tradition if we also consider 
the rest of his works.
Dewey was often critical of what he referred to as “tradition” throughout his 
career, for example, when he discussed customary or traditional morality in his 
Ethics (mW 5; LW 7). for Dewey, accepting “the authority of tradition in place 
of the authority of natural facts and laws” would “reduce the individual to a para-
site living on the secondhand experience of others” (LW 8:307). His negative 
view of tradition was very much an Enlightenment legacy, seeing tradition as the 
opposite of science, critical reason, reflective thought, and freedom.48 Discussing 
thoughts that are “picked up—we know not how,” Dewey asserted that “Tradi-
tion, instruction, imitation—all of which depend upon authority in some form, or 
appeal to our own advantage, or fall in with a strong passion—are responsible 
for them. Such thoughts are prejudices; that is, prejudgments, not conclusions 
reached as the result of personal mental activity, such as observing, collecting, 
and examining evidence” (LW 8:116). When he called science “a name for 
knowledge in its most characteristic form,” and continued that “knowledge is 
distinguished from opinion, guesswork, speculation, and mere tradition” (mW 
9:196), it is easy to link his promotion of science with rejection of tradition. 
Dewey often discussed social problems in terms of the “conflict of scientific 
conceptions of the world with beliefs hallowed by tradition and giving sanction 
to morals and religion” (mW 7:299; see also LW 3:116). In Dewey’s view, too 
many people are unable to leave behind traditions that have passed their “use-by” 
date. 
We are given to thinking that science has overthrown all enemies to its advance. This may 
be true of the technical aspects of science, those which have no clear social bearings. It is 
not true when newly discovered knowledge has important bearings upon the conduct of 
life. There is always a rearguard of ignorance, prejudice, dogma, routine, tradition, which 
fights against the spread of new ideas that entail new practices. (LW 6:146) 
48. of the ample evidence for this, some examples are in EW 3:128; mW 1:73; mW 3:130; LW 
1:169; LW 4; LW 6:62; LW 8:67; LW 11:142; LW 12:83.
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approaching issues and viewing the world from the perspective of tradition, 
rather than that of “unconstrained reflection,” often blind us to important changes 
that have occurred and even more important changes that need to be made (mW 
4:166; also mW 8:353). Dewey’s sympathy for the New culture movement was 
in perfect harmony with his own long-standing criticism of traditions in his own 
society that he believed had obstructed progress by denying the implications of 
new scientific knowledge and refusing the comprehensive use of the scientific 
method in improving lives.
back home in america, Dewey had fought against the effects of traditions in 
both education and philosophy, arguing for educational reforms and reconstruc-
tion of philosophy. Dewey criticized the “scholastic tradition” and the “classic 
tradition” in philosophy that resisted the “new science,” philosophical traditions 
that had bequeathed us with dualisms of theory/knowledge versus practice, body 
versus mind, matter versus spirit, reason versus emotion/imagination, means ver-
sus ends, among others. He played a key role in challenging prescientific tradi-
tional psychology in his efforts to approach education and other social problems 
scientifically. In his view, traditions in social and political life have often been 
aristocratic and authoritarian; they have reinforced the power of vested interests 
(LW 9:107); and “despotism while it lasts has sanction of tradition and general 
custom” (mW 15:270). In politics, tradition blocking change is among the causes 
of revolts and revolutions (LW 2:257). However, he noted “the importance of 
continuity of tradition in production of works of art, as well as of critical appreci-
ation of them” (LW 15:100). He often spoke approvingly of democratic tradition, 
liberal tradition, the tradition of a university, “the great tradition of autonomous 
literature, of music, of painting, of all the fine arts” (LW 11:117). 
Dewey highlighted the plurality of traditions (LW 10:314; LW 11:117), and on 
one occasion remarked that “There are traditions which are harmful, and there is 
equally in american life a lack of tradition which is harmful” (LW 11:337; also 
LW 2:19). He saw both good and bad in the “american tradition” (LW 5:49). 
In china, Dewey did not side with the chinese radical who “is not interested 
in improving what exists, but advocates replacing it with something entirely 
new and different.”49 He recommended a “third philosophy” that avoids the 
“dependence on sweeping generalizations” common to both conservatism and 
radicalism, that looks for particular kinds of solutions by particular methods for 
particular problems that arose on particular occasions.50 It is contrary to Dewey’s 
own philosophical method to treat “tradition” as an abstract idea—a single entity 
to be rejected totally; approaching tradition in this “wholesale form” renders the 
associated problems incapable of “intelligent and scientific attack” (LW 13:85). 
Instead, Dewey recognized many traditions, some good and some bad, some to 
be preserved, some to be modified, and some to be abandoned altogether, and 
insisted on the importance of distinguishing among them (LW 2:20).
Dewey identified at least two meanings of “tradition.” “as a noun, it desig-
nates a doctrine which is currently accepted in a community and which is handed 
on from generation to generation, being accepted on the authority of its past 
49. Dewey, Lectures (1973), 51.
50. Ibid., 53.
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currency rather than because of any independent examination and verification.”51 
This is the tradition he often criticized as the enemy of progress. “Tradition” 
also denotes a process, “the entire operation of transmission by which a society 
maintains the continuity of its intellectual and moral life” (mW 7:356). There is 
no society without tradition, whether understood as noun or process, something 
Dewey was fully aware of (“as a fact, tradition has of course always been opera-
tive”). our responses to others, the basic forms of nurture and care so critical 
to the continuation of our species, are themselves dependent upon tradition, 
custom, and social patterns (LW 2:243). “Tradition and custom, especially when 
emotionally charged, are a part of the habits that have become one with our very 
being” (LW 9:11). “In this dependence upon tradition there is nothing peculiar 
to art. The scientific inquirer, the philosopher, the technologist, also derive their 
substance from the stream of culture. This dependence is an essential factor in 
original vision and creative expression” (LW 10.270). Traditions can be enhanc-
ing and liberating tools; they become restrictive and enslaving only when they 
become fixed and absolute constraints, and thereby lose their reflective and cre-
ative capacity.
although blind obedience to tradition dispenses with thinking, any thinking 
that takes place always does so against “a background of tradition” (LW 6:12). 
“Wholesale revolt against tradition led to the illusion of equally wholesale isola-
tion of mind as something wholly individual. revolting and reforming thinkers 
like Descartes little noted how much of tradition they repeated and perpetu-
ated in their very protests and reforms” (LW 1:173-174). The self-deception of 
iconoclasts who thought they could free themselves completely from tradition is 
pernicious for it prevented them from examining their beliefs and practices in an 
intelligent manner that enables true progress. rather than total rejection, most 
often Dewey’s critiques of traditions were aimed at “the reworking of traditions 
(institutions, customs, beliefs of all sorts), to bring them into harmony with the 
potentialities of present science and technology”; Dewey was a “reconstructor of 
tradition.”52 Dewey’s message to his chinese audience was not entirely antitradi-
tion; he urged them “to conserve and transmit the best of our traditional cultural 
heritage, and . . . to cultivate personalities which can cope successfully with their 
environment. . . . We must reconstruct the traditional aims, methods, and subject 
matter of education so that it may adequately serve the needs of our age.”53 
a Pragmatic approach that draws from Dewey’s philosophy will therefore 
be one of reconstruction rather than total elimination or destruction of tradition. 
Traditions are ideas and social habits that developed in the past and have been 
handed down through generations because they had served each generation well 
in some ways and had been transmitted as a valuable inheritance, even if the 
value might have come to be taken for granted. They change over time even in 
51. mW 7:356. While Dewey saw it as “custom handed down from generation to generation,” 
“tradition has an intellectual quality that differentiates it from blind custom” (mW 7:356; LW 6:12).
52. LW 14:8. See also John Herman randall, Jr., “Dewey’s Interpretation of the History of Phi-
losophy,” in The Philosophy of John Dewey, ed. Paul arthur Schilpp, 2d edition (New York: Tudor, 
1951), 75-102.
53. Dewey, Lectures (1973), 188, 212.
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the most stable of societies. Where changes of social situations over time are 
gradual, modifications that occurred in response to the changes are minor, usually 
accidental, and often unnoticed. When modifications are deliberate, they tend to 
be offered as elaboration or extension of a tradition in an expanded horizon; such 
claims of continuity are open to challenges that raise questions about the identity 
and meaning of the tradition. When intellectual and social changes are so drastic 
that they call forth responses that seem to break radically with the past, then the 
value of erstwhile respected traditions comes under scrutiny. 
Instead of a struggle between defenders, who insist on eternally unchanging 
traditions embodying absolute values, and iconoclastic attackers better outcomes 
can be achieved through reconstruction as Dewey understands it. 
reconstruction is a periodic need of life. It represents, in history, the conflict between 
ideas and the institutions which embody those ideas. In animal life, it stands for the con-
flict between function and the structure which exercises the function; in the life of the 
individual, it is the conflict between habits and ideals; in general, it is the conflict between 
ends or aims and the means or machinery through which these ends are realized. (EW 
4:97)
These conflicts are brought about by uneven changes in each, thereby resulting 
in a breakdown of the interdependence that previously had enabled them to work 
well together. reconstruction is the adjustment of these conflicting elements—
ideas and institutions, function and structure, habits and ideals, means and ends—
to achieve efficacious interdependence once again. 
Traditions that require Pragmatic reconstruction may take the form of institu-
tions that no longer embody new ideas that have become dominant; they may be 
ideas that outlast the collapse of or drastic changes in the institutions that once 
embodied them; they may be old habits that render one ineffective in pursuing 
new ideals; they may be ancient ideals that can no longer be fulfilled by current 
practice; they may be mechanisms that are obsolete in the face of present goals; 
they may be ends of another era for which the means that could realize them are 
no longer available. Instead of simple, total replacement of the old with the new, 
reconstruction is an integration of old and new directed by intelligence, which 
Dewey understood as the “remaking of the old through union with the new” (LW 
11:37). 
It is conversion of past experience into knowledge and projection of that knowledge in 
ideas and purposes that anticipate what may come to be in the future and that indicate how 
to realize what is desired. The office of intelligence in every problem that either a person 
or a community meets is to effect a working connection between old habits, customs, 
institutions, beliefs, and new conditions. (LW 11:37)
Without intelligence, there is a danger that traditions will be followed without 
conscious attention to whether they suit the new conditions; lack of intelligence 
can also lead to an impatient and blind rush toward change without careful 
consideration of the appropriate nature and extent of the change that will best 
improve the situation. Pragmatic reconstruction of tradition as conceived by 
Dewey avoids both these undesirable extremes.
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V. TraDITIoN aND ProgrESS IN PragmaTIc coNfUcIaN rEcoNSTrUcTIoN
although Dewey was not an iconoclast, some might still be skeptical that Prag-
matic reconstruction of tradition can be reconciled with confucian veneration of 
the past, and argue that the two philosophies are based on historical conscious-
nesses with opposite orientations. Pragmatists have been charged with the belief 
that all change is good and progress is automatic. Dewey has been seen as a 
“progressive.”54 He frequently associated history with progress in his writings, 
especially those on education, maintaining that history presents “the main lines 
of social progress” (mW 4:209) and teaches “the methods of social progress” 
(mW 4:282). Dewey shared the progress-oriented historical consciousness of 
the modern West; he cited approvingly Lord acton’s characterization of modern 
history as ushering in “a new order of things, under a law of innovation, sapping 
the ancient reign of continuity.”55 This stress on development or progress, a linear 
view of history, is arguably the most important characteristic of Western histori-
cal thought, but is completely absent in indigenous chinese historiography, as Yü 
Ying-shih and others have noted.56 
according to Jörn rüsen, historical consciousness “makes sense of past 
change which can then be applied to the present, and thus enables people to 
anticipate the future, to guide their own activities by a future informed by the 
experiences of the past.”57 Instead of seeing the present as progress from the past 
and expecting the future to be better than both past and present, chinese historical 
consciousness since confucius views the past as superior to the present and as 
providing lessons on how to improve the present to recapture the achievements 
of a past golden age. While Dewey finds in history “methods of progress,” most 
chinese historians find in history a realized “vision of an all embracing norma-
tive order.”58 on-cho Ng and Edward Wang describe confucius as “engaged in 
54. Lewis E. Hahn’s “Introduction” to mW 10. See also ross Hoffman, Tradition and Progress 
(Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1938), 4; christopher Shannon, Conspicuous Criticism: 
Tradition, the Individual, and Culture in American Social Thought, from Veblen to Mills (baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Kieran Egan, Getting It Wrong from the Beginning: Our 
Progressivist Inheritance from Herbert Spencer, John Dewey, and Jean Piaget (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2002); John m. Jordan, Machine-age Ideology: Social Engineering and American 
Liberalism, 1911–1939 (chapel Hill: University of North carolina Press, 1994).
55. LW 1:333. Lord acton, “The Study of History,” Inaugural address at the University of cam-
bridge, delivered in 1895, reprinted in Essays on Freedom and Power (boston: beacon Press, 1948), 5.
56. Peter burke, “Western Historical Thinking in a global Perspective—10 Theses” in Western 
Historical Thinking: An Intercultural Debate, ed. Jörn rüsen (New York: berghahn, 2002), 17-19; 
in the same volume, Yü Ying-shih, “reflections on chinese Historical Thinking,” 153. There are, 
however, more limited “developmental strains” within specific periods, argued for by a minority of 
chinese thinkers, for example, Han fei; see Yü, “reflections,” 168. benjamin Schwartz also noted 
“progress” in a limited sense in the tendency to view a current dynasty as superior to the last; see 
“History in chinese culture: Some comparative reflections,” History and Theory, Chinese Histori-
ography in Comparative Perspective, Theme Issue 35 (December 1996), 32.
57. Jörn rüsen, “Some Theoretical approaches to Intercultural comparative Historiography,” 
History and Theory, Theme Issue 35 (December 1996), 12.
58. Schwartz, “History in chinese culture,” 27. See also rüsen, “Some Theoretical approaches,” 
17 (“general rules of human conduct” in historical examples); for the dominant modes of classicality, 
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the pursuit and study of history, from which valuable information on the ideal 
zhou culture was gathered”; his goal was to “evoke the memories of the past by 
writing and teaching history, recalling the sagely rulers of yore who had exempli-
fied and personified the cherished values of china.”59 This view of confucius’s 
contribution to chinese historiography’s normative approach that treats the past 
as a “mirror” for the present and future can be traced to Mencius 3b9: “When the 
world declined and the Way fell into obscurity, heresies and violence again arose. 
There were instances of regicides and parricides. confucius was apprehensive 
and composed the Spring and Autumn Annals.”60
The clash between modern Western historical consciousness and chinese his-
torical consciousness exemplified in the confucian tradition is mitigated to some 
extent by Dewey’s recognition that progress is not automatic but is a responsi-
bility every generation either chooses to strive for with intelligence or fails to 
do so, without guarantee of success even if they so choose (mW 10:234-241), 
and by the confucian view of historical knowledge as pragmatic, giving human 
agency an important though not completely determining role in making history.61 
a tension still remains. Even when he was criticizing the “childish and irrespon-
sible” faith in progress as guaranteed by history (mW 10:235), Dewey remained 
optimistic that modern science rather than traditional ways of life offers “a sure 
method” for progress, and it is up to the current generation to use intelligence to 
achieve it (mW 10:237). Pragmatic confucians would differ in relying more on 
traditional values and seeking historical exemplars in their quest for progress. 
This apparently conservative and anachronistic approach may seem paradoxical. 
However, Pierre ryckmans has observed that confucius’s view of the past as 
providing exemplars for contemporary conduct was less conservative than might 
first appear: “the antiquity to which he referred was a lost antiquity, which the 
Sage had to seek and practically to reinvent. Its actual contents were thus highly 
fluid and not susceptible to objective definition or circumscription by a specific 
historical tradition.”62 rather than resisting all change, tradition as interpreted in 
contemporary discourse provides the means to criticize the present and change 
the future by borrowing the authority of the ancients.63 Learning from the past 
and valuing tradition need not be anachronistic if one avoids purely linear, 
deontological thinking that treats historical examples as embodying universal 
principles. chun-chieh Huang, who describes the confucian view of the human 
person as homo historien, argues that confucian humanistic tradition manifests 
itself in “analogical, correlative and concrete thinking,” involving a “creative dia-
caducity, and continuity in chinese historical thinking, see on-cho Ng and Q. Edward Wang, Mir-
roring the Past: The Writing and Use of History in Imperial China (Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press, 2005), xix.
59. Ng and Wang, Mirroring the Past, 17, 19.
60. Mencius 4b21 quotes confucius on his having “appropriated the didactic principles” in earlier 
historical works.
61. Yü, “reflections,” 159-161.
62. Pierre ryckmans, “The chinese attitude towards the Past,” Papers on Far Eastern History 
39 (march 1989), 7. 
63. for contemporary examples of how history could be used or interpreted as commentaries/
critiques on contemporary politics and society, see Using the Past to Serve the Present, ed. Jonathan 
Unger (armonk, NY: m. E. Sharpe).
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logue” between past and present.64 “In chinese historical thinking, the so-called 
‘cognitive’ activity actually moves back and forth in time, first going to the past 
for information, then coming back with lessons to shape ourselves by, then going 
back again to ascribe meaning and significance to the past, as well as more impli-
cations, then coming back once again for more inspiration to live accordingly in 
the present moment.”65 When functioning properly, this dynamic “hermeneutic 
circle” prevents the process of learning from the past from either reducing history 
to mere fiction, inventions intended only to serve contemporary purposes, or to 
a futile attempt to turn back the clock in a procrustean forcing of present experi-
ence into old molds with the demand of faithful re-enactment of past exemplary 
conduct. a Pragmatic confucian approach is selective in its transmission of the 
past and flexible enough in its “preservation” to allow for change that, though 
gradual rather than radical, can nevertheless prove to be progressive over time.
However much he respected the ancients, confucius was selective in his own 
“transmission.” There was no way he could have replicated everything he knew 
of the past for the simple reason that there had been changes that resulted in 
different or even contradictory ideas or practices from which he had to choose. 
He recommended selecting from different dynasties practices that would make a 
“viable state” and explicitly rejected certain past practices as undesirable (Ana-
lects 15.11). In his editorial endeavors—revising the Book of Music, and putting 
the “Songs of the Kingdom” and the “ceremonial Hymns” in order (Analects 
9.15)—confucius did more than merely copying or recording; the project must 
have involved critical selection. He explicitly advised us to “learn much, select 
out of it what works well, and then follow it” (Analects 7.28). Selectivity, the 
discrimination between what is valued and not valued, is implied by the term 
“shu 述,” used in the well-known passage about confucius “transmitting without 
creating.”66 meaning “following a path,” “shu 述” is a homonym and cognate, 
sometimes even substituted by, “shu 术,” meaning an “art” or a “method,” as in 
the “confucian arts” that Dong zhongshu urged the Han emperor Wu to promote 
over all other teachings.67 While “shu 术” may also mean a “device” or a “trick,” 
things that may seem ethically dubious, what is worth noting is that whether as 
“art” or “trick,” it is something that works within a particular context and takes 
into account changing circumstances. 
chinese civilization acknowledged the pervasiveness and significance of 
change very early in its history. The chinese approach the past not as something 
to be preserved against all change but rather as something that can be kept alive in 
different forms through numerous changes.68 change is inherent in the very pro-
64. chun-chieh Huang, Humanism in East Asian Contexts (New brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers, 2010), 81. Huang himself still falls back on “a sense of a universal principle,” although he 
emphasizes that “Whenever the chinese thinkers want to ‘argue’ about universal principles or draw 
up moral codes, they always return to concrete historical examples or experiences” [ibid., 121, 127]).
65. Ibid., 132.
66. Analects 7.1; other occurrences of the term in which selectivity is implied are Analects 14.43 
and 17.19.
67. Han dynasty dictionary, Shuowen jiezi [analyzing and Explaining characters], comp. and 
ed.,Xu Shen (Shanghai: guji chubanshe, 1981), 70b.
68. ryckmans, “The chinese attitude towards the Past,” 2-4.
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cess of transmission. Nothing is ever transmitted exactly as it was, no matter how 
much one might strive for it to be or pretend that it is so (mW 14:69). confucius 
recognized the need to change traditional practices to meet new demands and new 
circumstances without abandoning what is valuable in tradition (Analects 9.3). 
Despite his “love for the ancient,” older was not always better for confucius; oth-
erwise he would have preferred the earlier dynasty of Xia to the dynasty of zhou. 
His preference for zhou (Analects 3.14)—a later dynasty that altered and adapted 
the rituals of their predecessors, the Yin (Analects 2.23)—testifies to his recogni-
tion of the need to improve on what one has learned from the past, rather than 
merely imitating or following. contrary to the common belief that confucianism 
is hostile to creativity or innovation, we find innovation in the Analects, as well 
as a kind of creativity that is not creatio ex nihilo but significant transformation 
of the old into the new.69 although he himself was too modest to acknowledge it, 
or perhaps this is something only the passage of time has made clear, confucius 
transformed the traditions he transmitted so significantly that he deserved to be 
treated as the founder of a new tradition. 
one of confucius’s innovations was “to transform the focus of his Ru group 
from pure ritual mastery to include the study of texts.”70 confucius’s emphasis 
on studying texts transmitted from the past, such as the “Songs,” is not about 
preserving the past for its own sake but about its use in present practice. “for 
close at hand it allowed one to serve one’s father, and away at court it enabled 
one to serve one’s lord” (Analects 17.9; also 16.13). confucius’s exchanges with 
his students zi Xia and zigong about the “Songs” also demonstrate that what 
confucius wanted was not mere regurgitation of the transmitted songs. He was 
“stimulated” by a question zi Xia asked about the standard reading first provided 
by the master (Analects 3.8). Questioning what is being transmitted is part and 
parcel of interpreting and understanding it, and the questioning necessarily pro-
ceeds from the interlocutor’s present experience, as with zi Xia’s interpreting a 
song about a woman’s beauty to illuminate ritual practice, which was very much 
a present concern for him. The primacy of practice is also central to the confu-
cian conception of learning and knowledge, and confucius’s love for antiquity 
is closely linked to his love for learning; traditions present a vast reservoir of 
knowledge.71 Learning gives delight when one is able to practice at appropriate 
times (Analects 1.1). “reviewing the old as a means of realizing the new, such 
a person can be considered a teacher” (Analects 2.11). The contrast between old 
and new emphasizes change. The challenge of teaching and, by implication, of 
learning as well, is to make what is old serviceable in new situations, a challenge 
69. for detailed discussion of this, see Sor-hoon Tan, “Three corners for one: Tradition and cre-
ativity in the Analects,” in Confucius Now: Contemporary Encounters with the analects, ed. David 
Jones (chicago and La Salle, IL: open court, 2008), 59-77.
70. chad Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought (oxford: oxford University Press, 1992), 
58.
71. on the relation between love of antiquity and love of learning in the Analects, see Sor-hoon 
Tan, “confucian Democracy as Pragmatic Experiment: Uniting Love of Learning and Love of 
antiquity,” Asian Philosophy 17, no. 2 (July 2007), 141-166. on the relation between tradition and 
knowledge, see Shils, Tradition., 89-94; Hans-georg gadamer, Truth and Method, transl. garrett 
barden and W. glen-Doepel, ed. John cumming (London: Sheed and Ward, 1975), 252-253; J. c. 
Nyíri, Tradition and Individuality (London: Kluwer, 1992), 48.
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directly addressed by Dewey’s concept of intelligence. Knowledge for confucius 
is “active” (Analects 6.23), for it is not purely intellectual, but a form of practice. 
one looks to a person’s practice to determine if he “knows the rites” (Analects 
3.22, 7.31). There are several other occasions where the Analects judges a per-
son’s knowledge or learning by scrutinizing his actions (Analects 1.7; 6.22; 
12.22). If knowledge lies in efficacious practice, and traditions may be viewed 
as a form of knowledge, then the inevitable selectivity and change in traditions 
could be rendered intelligent if traditions are selected and changed in the process 
of reconstruction on the basis of efficacious practice in the present.
Whether a present practice is efficacious depends not only on whether the 
immediate experience is satisfying, but also looks toward future consequences, 
whether future experience will also be satisfying, whether the practice offers a 
path of growth or atrophy for persons and communities. Though few would con-
sider confucius “progressive,” this forward-looking aspect is by no means absent 
in the Analects. The master praised zigong’s understanding of the songs because 
“on the basis of what has been said, [he knew] what is yet to come” (Analects 
1.15). Understanding begins with interpretation of tradition that simultaneously 
applies it to the present and future. In the depictions of exemplary learning in 
the Analects (1.15; 5.9; 7.8), the extension of the learner’s horizon through the 
productive tension between past and present is central to confucius’s idea of 
teaching and learning. clearly confucius’s “transmission” is not simply impos-
ing the past unchanged on the present—a futile exercise in any case. change is 
inevitable; the difference lies in whether it is accidental and arbitrary, or intelli-
gently directed through careful selection and modification of what is transmitted, 
toward a better future. confucian transmission of traditions, in order to be endur-
ing and successful, has to be a dynamic process of meeting new challenges with 
resources accumulated in the past, which then become revitalized and renewed 
in being made useful and relevant to the present. In Pragmatic reconstruction, the 
fusion of historical horizon with the horizon of the present “opens up” the future, 
which I offer as a hermeneutic explication of the chinese idiom “ji-wang-kai-lai 
继往开来.” modern confucians can open up that better future for china through 
Pragmatic reconstruction of traditions.
confucians today could reconstruct chinese traditions to contribute to human 
growth in the Deweyan sense. In other words, they could convert past experience 
as captured and crystallized in confucian teachings into knowledge relevant to 
present problems, and project that knowledge in “ideas and purposes that antici-
pate what may come to be in the future and that indicate how to realize what is 
desired” (LW 11:37). This cannot be achieved by returning to the obscure philo-
logical scholarship of traditional textual criticism, no matter how interesting to 
the specialists. Nor is it about winning the battle over what confucius or any of 
his followers in the confucian tradition “really” said and what the interlocutors 
or authors of confucian texts “really” intended or meant, even if such can be 
determined. confucians willing to adopt Pragmatic reconstruction as method will 
have to begin with the present experience of those in china who may still inherit 
and carry on the confucian legacy, including its respect for tradition. This present 
already contains both past and future. It is “a course of action, a process including 
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memory, observation and foresight, a pressure forward, a glance backward, and 
a look outward” (mW 14:195). Pragmatic reconstruction of chinese traditions 
needs to integrate china’s past, present, and future to achieve optimum growth 
in the Deweyan sense (not just economic, but also moral, aesthetic, generally 
holistic growth in humanity and civilization).
In china today, there remain very few, if any, traditional confucian institutions 
or practices that could be reconstructed. Joseph Levenson’s well-known work 
argues that confucian china survived in communist china only in fragments, 
and has moved “from the present world outside, into the museum.”72 others have 
agreed with remarks such as “confucianism is dead,” and lamentations on the 
“survival crisis of chinese traditional culture with confucianism at its core.”73 
Intellectual historians refer to confucianism in contemporary china as a “wan-
dering spirit” or “lost soul.”74 In its darkest hour, confucianism seems to have 
been reduced to dusty ancient texts read by only a few curious academics. recent 
revival of interest in confucianism has more often taken the form of intellectual 
discourses rather than institutional reforms or practical projects. This is not to say 
that there have been no proposals to revive confucian institutions or practices 
within that intellectual revival or proposals to modify current institutions along 
confucian lines; and there are even a few practical developments that have drawn 
attention, for example, the movement toward reading classical texts promoted 
by Jiang Qing, who also attempted to live personally like a traditional confucian 
and started a private academy near the place of ming-dynasty confucian Wang 
Yangming’s enlightenment; Tang Enjia’s confucian academy in Hong Kong; 
and the revival of various rituals at confucian temples all over china. 
from a Pragmatic perspective, reconstruction must bring together ideas and 
practices, not focus on one to the exclusion of another. There is no essence of 
confucianism that can be revived with the restoration of any particular institu-
tional form or practice—those institutions and practices of the past emerged from 
the needs and other circumstances of particular historical situations; none of them 
are necessary to confucianism. reconstruction of confucian tradition means 
employing textual and historical resources to solve certain present problems in 
ways that continue the interrupted growth of confucianism and at the same time 
contribute to further growth of human beings as we know them today. given the 
all too apparent inadequacies of actual historical political institutions and prac-
tices, more supporters of confucianism today are likely to seek reconstruction in 
the ideas of confucian philosophy of life, such as the traditional virtues of ren, 
yi, li, zhi, and xin, or the traditional value of harmony. However, Pragmatists 
72. Joseph r. Levenson, Confucian China and its Modern Fate (berkeley: University of california 
Press, 1968), III, 113
73. Interview with Julia ching by Kao chen, “chinese culture is Dead,” The Straits Times 
(may 14, 2000); zhang Xianglong, “crisis of chinese Traditional culture,” November 2001. http://
www.confuchina.com/01%20zong%20lun/zhongguo%20wenhua%20weiji.htm (accessed august 13, 
2011).
74. Yü Ying-Shih, “The Dilemma of modern confucianism,” in Macro-perspectives on the 
Development of Confucianism, ed. Tu Wei-ming (Taipei: zheng zhong, 1997); John makeham, Lost 
Soul: “Confucianism” in Contemporary Chinese Academic Discourse (cambridge, ma: Harvard 
University Press, 2008); see also Tang Junyi, On the Chinese People’s Flowers and Fruits Scattered 
to the Winds (Taipei: Sanmin, 1974).
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would argue that confucianism’s role today, even for those who value traditions, 
is not to provide universal unchanging ideals exactly as taught by confucius and 
neglected for the last century. rather, the ideas that Pragmatic confucians select 
from their interpretations of traditional texts are tools for reconstruction of the 
present, and as part of chinese traditions, these ideas are reconstructed as they 
enter into present problems. To view the transmission of chinese traditions today, 
and confucian traditions in particular, as a process of Pragmatic reconstruction 
means acknowledging that it inevitably involves selectivity and change based 
on the primacy of present practice and aims at the future in terms of growth for 
humanity. Such an approach to traditions is not merely a foreign imposition on 
confucianism, but is an element one could find in the Analects itself.
National University of Singapore
